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Knowing and Valuing, 
The Search for Common Roots 
Volume IV of 
The Foundations of Ethics and 
Its Relationship to Science 
H. Tristram Engelhart, Jr. and Daniel Callahan, Editors 
The Hastings Ce n ter, 360 Broadway, Hastings-on·Hudson, N. Y. 10706, 1980. vii + 
286 pp., $9.95 (soft cover). 
Knowing and Valuing is the fourth and culminating volum e of a series en t itled 
T he Fou ndations of Ethics and Its Relationship to Science edited by H. Tristram 
Engelha rdt, J r., and Daniel Callahan. The vo lumes are the resul t of over fo ur years 
of interdisc iplinary discuss io ns on this ge neral them e which were sponsored by the 
Hastings Cen ter. As Engelhardt expla ins in th e introduction, the increasing aware-
ness of the interrelation of value issues with sc ien tific and techno logical issu es, 
and t he reciprocal influence of these d isc iplines, have led to more fund am ental 
questi ons about the foundations of eth ics and science and w hat correlations th ere 
may be between them. Perhaps the clearest conclusion em erging from t his series 
of essays is Engelhardt's statement t hat "The in terrelations of science and ethics 
are ... many-leveled and complex." 
The structure of t he book reflects the interdisciplinary discussions from wh ich 
it resu lts. There are six major essays each fo llowed by a commentary, and two 
general com mentaries at the end which reflect on both the preceding work in th is 
volume and the work of the project as a w hole. Each of the major essays attem pts 
to address some topic of relevance to the relat ions between ethics and science. 
The first essay by Alasdair MacIntyre asks the question of why the search for 
t he foundations of ethics is so frustrating. He describes the present moral climate 
as one in which we are unable to reso lve confl icts of rules or principles at a 
priority level. Although, for example, to justify a particular course of action we 
might appeal to a utilitarian or contractarian or deontological approach, we have 
no satisfactory way to justify tak ing one of these approaches as opposed to 
another, but seem ultimately to rely on intuition to settle such debates. This, of 
course, has the result that we can never convince anyone whose "intuitions" are 
different from our own of the validity of our approach. MacIntyre suggests that 
our situation with respect to the justification of moral rules is similar to that of a 
culture which has taboo rules but has lost the larger context in which such rules 
had intelligibility. Our first task, then, in seeking foundations will be to search his-
torically for the larger contexts which made these moral approaches intelligible. 
Put perhaps too simply, we cannot have an intelligible ethics apart from a meta-
physics. Of course, the more difficult task of justifying the metaphysics in order 
to justify the ethics remains. It isn't clear why on these larger issues we may still 
not have to rely ultimately on intuition, but I think MacIntyre at the least is cor· 
rect that we rely on intuition at the wrong point. 
84 Linacre Quarterly 
As MacIntyre suggests that contemporary ethics needs to be seen in a larger 
context, Stephen Toulmin suggests that science, too, has suffered from an isola-
tion from a broader world-view. Part of his essay is an outline of why and how 
science came to isolate itself, citing factors like a fear of relativism and subjectiv-
ity associated (to a mistaken degree, Toulmin thinks) with value issues, and the 
move toward greater scientific specialization. It is apparent to Toulmin that this 
isolation has begun to break down, e.g., in the move of science into psychology, in 
bioethics, etc. To continue the task of reconnecting the sciences with the fou nda-
tions of ethics, Toulmin sets forth certain conditions for this work (which seem 
rather protective of scientists) and then suggests levels of the scientific enterprise, 
such as in providing a better understanding of the human place in the natural 
world, that may cast light on the foundations of ethics. 
Through a concentration on the rational bases of both science and morality, 
Gunther Stent draws an interesting parallel between them - that both are 
internally inconsistent. Instead of seeing this inconsistency in a lack of touch with 
larger contexts as does MacIntyre, Stent argues that the incoherence is due to the 
paradoxical nature of reason itself. For example, just as sc ience must deal with the 
"complementarity" of different theories in quantum physics , so ethics must face 
the "complementarity" (and thus inconsistency) of goals such as justice and char-
ity . If there are to be possible resolutions to these paradoxes, Stent thinks they 
are likely to be found in the very differen t conceptions of science and of ethics of 
Far Eastern thought. 
Richard D. Alexander's purpose is to outline the implications for the under-
standing of ethics of the refinements in evolutionary theory within biology, 
specifically the theory that individual human behavior and culture are best 
explained as results of "inclusive-fitness-maximizing" behavior. In this context, 
Alexander sees ethics as deriving solely from conflicts of interest, biologically 
interpreted in terms of genetic differences to which social interpretations of con-
flicts of interest are reducible. A descriptive analysis of past normative ethics must 
focus on the problem of individuals maximizing their inclusive fitness. What is 
especially interesting in Alexander's view is his contention that conscious knowl-
edge of the genetic basis of human behavior can lead to a radical change in that 
basis (perhaps even to freedom) and thus to a radical change in the nature of 
ethics. 
In the fifth essay, there is a shift to theological foundations of ethics in a 
primarily descriptive attempt by James M. Gustafson to layout certain theological 
assumptions which bear on the relation of theology to ethics. Most of his atten-
tion is focused on the last of his assumptions, that theology provides a way of 
construing the world, more specifically that the construing is "an intention to 
relate to all things in ways appropriate to their relations to God." Gustafson 
insists that construing the world theologically must include reference to the 
reality of an ultimate power. This construing will give shape and substance to the 
moral analyses we make as we consider the circumstances involved in actions, the 
agents and their acts, the ends and consequences of actions , and finally the mean-
ing of the whole moral situation. Gustafson illustrates this construing in each of 
these four areas, for example, in suggesting that the circumstances of the Exodus 
can speak to us about current conditions of oppression. He then outlines certain 
probl ems that need to be addressed to attempt to relate to all things appropriate 
to their relations to God. These involve determining how God relates to all t hings 
and how the t heologian can claim to have such knowledge. 
Only t he last of the major essays specifically focuses on the implications for 
medicine of the foundations of ethics in relation to science. H. Tristram Engel-
hart, Jr., seeks to remind us how inescapably interrelated medicine is with value 
and ethical issues. More specifically, he seeks to counter the contention of Leon 
Kass that certain ethical problems do not belong in the arena of medicine, and 
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thus ought not to be problems for medical practitioners, by arguing that the arena 
of medicine is properly determined by patients' complaints. In other words, any 
bona fide complaint (with criteria for bona fide complaint defined at some length 
by Engelhardt) is sufficient grounds for medical therapy. The medical prac-
titioner, then, cannot define ethical problems of this sort as out of his/her 
domain, but instead must confront them . 
There is not space to develop the basic points of all the commentaries (includ-
ing the last two general ones by Tom L. Beauchamp and Ronald Green), some of 
which (in a more positive than negative sense , I think) blur the distinction 
between the commentaries and the essays. Let me just mention two that may be 
of particular interest. Paul Ramsey's response to Richard Alexander suggests some 
very interesting (and, I suspect, correct) reasons why the gene-proliferation theory 
cannot be proven, in particular that in its own light the theory itself may only be 
a means to gene-proliferation. Such unprovability does not, of course , show the 
theory to be false but would certainly make us cautious in accepting it. But for 
me the most interesting commentary was that of Hans Jonas who attempted to do 
more concretely what he was as Gustafson's task - to show what difference to 
our ethical decisions our theological beliefs might make. Jonas , who is not a theo-
logian, identifies a difficult but necessary task for people who are not theologians 
but who find significance in theological frameworks. 
There is both virtue and difficulty in the interdisciplinary and group nature of 
the work. For most of us who are schooled primarily in one discipline, essays 
whose authors stem from another can be quite difficult. That very difficulty, 
however, points to limitations that we must attempt to transcend, given the 
importance of the relations between science and ethics. In this light, the work of 
the Hastings Center on this project seems not only necessary but courageous in 
the willingness of participants to cross disciplinary lines. I don't think anyone 
would find crossing the lines in these essays insuperably difficult . 
The virtue and difficulty can be seen on another level in this discussion. As 
anyone knows who has tried coordinating a project, even with members of a single 
discipline let alone an interdisciplinary group, it is difficult to establish a coher· 
ence to the project as a whole, given that people have different interpretations of 
the task, or see different questions as most important, or have different beliefs 
about which levels of issues need most to be addressed. Thus, I do not think that, 
other than on the very general level of the interrelation between ethics and 
science, one is likely to find much coherence among all of these essays , or a sense 
that there is a clear progression toward reaching answers for certain questions. 
This point seems to be made by both of the final commentators as well, who agree 
that there is much work yet to do. Thus, if one were approaching the book with 
the expectation of gaining a much clearer understanding of what the foundations 
of ethics are and how they relate to the sciences, I think one would be dis-
appointed. Yet such complexity is, at least in my view, in tune with the world in 
which we live and thus may well be a virtue rather than a fault . Engelhardt sug-
gests in the introduction that the project may have been more successful at learn-
ing to ask the right questions than in attaining the right answers. This book surely 
does raise interesting and necessary questions about the relations of science and 
ethics, and points us in worthwhile directions for study and reflection. If one 
shares with me those sorts of expectations from a work of this kind, I do not 
think one would be disappointed. 
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